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— his paper examines the evolving symbiosis of authoritarian state power and neoliberal gov-
ernance in the Middle East in the wake of the 2007–8 economic crisis and popular uprisings 
in 2011–13. I revisit the debates on “authoritarian resilience” in the region to highlight that 
the efforts to push through neoliberal reforms in the face of popular opposition have ex-
panded the scope of authoritarian rule. However, the strengthening of the executive power 
further creates antagonisms which are bound to result in the weakening of the state’s institu-
tional capacity and legitimacy to enforce those reforms. hese considerations highlight the 
issures of “authoritarian resilience” in the region and signal that state centralization and the 
strengthening of executive power could produce avenues for contesting both neoliberalism 
and authoritarianism. 
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Authoritarian Resilience in the Middle East
he election of Donald Trump in the US following a campaign built on racial(ized) and economic 
anxieties, the Brexit vote—which revolved around a deluge of imperial nostalgia and economic 
discontent—a right-wing populist surge in Europe (Mudde 2016), the revival of “illiberal democra-
cies” (Rupnik 2016), and a wave of “populist authoritarian” regimes gaining increased visibility and 
power across the world (Chako and Jayasuriya 2017) are fuelling widespread concerns about a 
broader shit towards authoritarianism and the viability of (liberal) democracies. he proliferation 
of the terms of reference and concepts utilized in these discussions deies clear-cut categorization, 
but the extent of political and academic soul-searching propelled by these phenomena suggests that 
for many observers of democratic politics, democracy is under threat. his apprehension has re-
sulted in renewed efforts to understand and explain the seeming appeal of right-wing populist, au-
thoritarian and even fascist ideas and practices across the world. For those who are more concerned 
with the developments in the global North, Middle Eastern politics has been quickly positioned as 
the ideal source of comparison to unpack the Western democracies’ illiberal/authoritarian drit, 
leading many observers to highlight the affinities between the emergent (or more accurately, now 
explicit) practices in the distressed Western democracies and authoritarian governments in the 
Middle East (Rachman 2017; Klaas 2018). Such affinities have been further bolstered by the re-
newed diplomatic support the Trump administration has extended to Presidents Abdel Fattah al-
Sisi and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—both of whom received a warm welcome in the White House. 
 While the expanding range of practices shared between these governments should be recog-
nized and scrutinized, the positioning of Middle Eastern states in these conversations about the 
future of democracy raises further questions. For some, the engagement with Middle Eastern states 
seems to be designed to procure “lessons” for the West, an exercise that oten results in exceptional-
izing the state practices in the region and signals that these practices are being imported into the 
otherwise healthy and well-functioning institutions of Western democracies.  Furthermore, the 1
suggested “lessons” are limited to the “political” components of authoritarianism(s), thus leaving 
out some key questions around, among others, class relations, social reproduction and the distribu-
tion and ownership of resources and wealth. In other words, there is a risk that such comparative 
efforts could interpret the illiberal/authoritarian shit in the West as a moment of exception and 
conversely associate authoritarianism as a set of policies and practices that are ordinarily found “out 
there”, e.g. in the Middle East. 
 How can we make sense of this emergent web of practices that observers identify in both the 
illiberalizing Western democracies and minimal or non-democracies in the Middle East? What sort 
of concepts help us examine this “authoritarian turn” in global politics without associating authori-
tarian practices strictly with regional dynamics or rendering them as external anomalies to the 
“normal” operation of Western democracies? In this paper, I offer a tentative strategy with which to 
unpack these questions and contextualize the proliferation of authoritarian state practices in the 
global North and South as a partial product of neoliberalization. I revisit the authoritarian re-
silience and democratization discussions to suggest a number of ways with which we can chart out 
the relationship between neoliberalism and democratic debilitation, by which I refer not only to a 
degradation in the effectiveness and legitimacy of representative democratic institutions, but also to 
a shit from political deliberation and contestation towards executive control in shaping policy 
(White 2015; Clua-Losada and Ribera-Almandoz 2017). 
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 Ongoing popular acts of resistance that take both quotidian and organized, collective forms in 
the Middle East continue to undermine the established notions of “resilient” authoritarian rule. It 
is, ater all, only a few years ago that monumental waves of popular mobilizations swept the region, 
generating much discussion about the prospects of a region-wide “transition” to democracy. he 
uprisings complicated the dominant narratives of democratization and authoritarianism by draw-
ing attention to the questions of political economy and articulating a common language that un-
equivocally centered on material struggles. Mobilizations were not only propelled against authori-
tarian rule, but also against the wide-ranging consequences of neoliberalization (Bogaert 2013; 
Hanieh 2013). While it would be reductive to portray the diverse motivations of the mobilized 
masses as a uniied response to a monolithic “neoliberalism”, it is undeniable that many of the ma-
terial predicaments targeted by the masses had been triggered by waves of neoliberal reform which 
reconigured the states’ (re)distributive mechanisms and rapidly deteriorated material conditions 
for different social forces. Despite the inability of the revolts to drastically change the trajectory of 
neoliberalization, it is important to recognize them as a key moment that conjoined the calls for 
democratization with demands for alternative socio-economic arrangements. 
 Against the background of ostensible authoritarian “resilience” in the Middle East and in dia-
logue with the recent contributions in critical political economy that emphasize the importance of 
moving away from domination-oriented accounts of neoliberalism (Bailey et al. 2017), I will offer 
snapshots to highlight the extant and emerging issures in the armor of authoritarian states. he 
bulk of my discussion is organized around material drawn from the cases of Egypt and Turkey—
two countries that witnessed both the largest and most sustained mobilizations in the 2011–2013 
period and a rapid (re)constitution of authoritarian state practices in the atermath of the uprisings. 
he paper, accordingly, advances two interlinked arguments: (1) Focus on the persistence of au-
thoritarianism in the Middle East needs to be complemented with an appreciation of how neoliber-
alism has provided an alternative development and legitimization strategy for authoritarian gov-
ernments, thus bolstering and actively reproducing the practices of authoritarian statecrat; (2) 
analyses of the “resilience” of authoritarianism should be complemented with a deeper attention 
paid to how the mechanisms of authoritarian rule erode structures of legitimacy and political ac-
tion, which ultimately destabilize even the most ostensibly “resilient” regimes. 
Authoritarian resilience and neoliberalism in the Middle East 
Just as the recent political developments in the global North and South are compelling scholars to 
rethink the way democracy and authoritarianism are conceptualized,  the uprisings of 2011–13 in 2
the Middle East have let their imprint on a range of debates and approaches. Since 2011, the estab-
lished categories that have long shaped the study of the region have been thrown into disarray or 
given a new lease of life (Pace and Cavatorta 2012; Bellin 2012; Hale 2014; Tansel 2018a). A major 
area of contestation emerged around the debates on authoritarian resilience/persistence and de-
mocratization, two cognate literatures that have been deployed extensively to explain a key research 
puzzle, namely the apparent non-existence or weakness of democracy in the Middle East (particu-
larly in Arab states), and the continuing ability of the region’s authoritarian regimes to reproduce 
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themselves despite a global trajectory marked by the “third wave of democratization” from 1970s 
onwards (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004). 
 Repeated efforts to piece this puzzle together have oten remained within the conines of a 
deeply Eurocentric perspective on the region, one which exacerbates a dichotomous understanding 
of political and socio-economic change in the global North versus South, and insufficiently situates 
the practices of authoritarian statecrat in the Middle East within a global context shaped by impe-
rialist geopolitics. he constitutive contributions to both the democratization and authoritarian 
resilience literatures prioritized domestic variables, and despite some noteworthy efforts to bring 
“the international” back in to the analysis, a stable mix of assumptions revolving around the themes 
of domestic elite alliances/contestations, cultural attitudes and institutional weaknesses have domi-
nated the way most scholars examined the question of democracy in the region. Normatively and 
methodologically, the democratization scholarship has remained wedded to “a particular interpre-
tation of Western democracies’ historical development”, which has resulted in the privileging of 
liberal democracy as the ultimate end point of political development (Teti 2012: 13). 
 Notwithstanding the important insights offered by both the pre- and post-uprisings literature 
on democratization and authoritarian resilience,  there are two issues that compel us to engage 3
more critically with the way authoritarian state practices are conceptualized and should be linked 
to the processes of neoliberalization. First, the internalist focus of the dominant approaches to de-
mocratization has carried signiicant ramiications for how the region’s economic trajectory is ex-
amined and represented. One key side effect has been the decoupling of “economic” and “political” 
questions and their treatment as separate variables, with the “political” components oten receiving 
priority in analyzing the barriers to and prospects of democracy (cf. Abdelrahman 2012; Teti 2012). 
his tendency to bifurcate the questions of political economy from a wider analysis of democracy 
and authoritarianism has either produced a problematic focus on concepts such as the “rentier 
state” (cf. Allinson 2015), or, more recently, distorted the way many observers interpreted the im-
pact of neoliberalization, particularly in periods where the governments succeeded in meeting cer-
tain macroeconomic targets such as improvements in GDP growth rates (Tansel 2018a). In the cas-
es of Egypt and Turkey, short-term macroeconomic achievements gave rise to a popular narrative 
of success stories,  which served to underplay the socio-economic, political and environmental 4
costs of growth and to legitimize neoliberal reform. 
 Second, even in the carefully constructed accounts of post-uprisings resilience, there is a danger 
of assigning too much stability and coherence to the reconstituted authoritarianisms. Authoritarian 
states in the region continue to breed instability and insecurity in no small part due to the em-
ployed neoliberal reforms’ increasing inability to offer economic justice. As the 2014 Arab Trans-
formations survey reveals, citizens’ distrust in the states’ ability to improve economic conditions 
remains high in Arab states. For example, 69.2 percent of the respondents in Egypt highlighted 
economic grievances as the main trigger of the uprisings, yet economic concerns continued to 
dominate the public mood with 90.3 percent of the respondents lagging up the economic situation 
as the biggest challenge facing the country (Abbott and Teti 2017: 2). A similar trend is visible in 
Turkey, where the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) celebrated “growth” years failed to pro-
duce sustainable job creation and recent surveys signal that the state of the economy is increasingly 
becoming a major concern for the population (Sönmez 2018; Ipsos 2018). 
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 I will dedicate the remaining pages to highlight how the extreme concentration of power and 
decision-making in the executive and the incumbents’ continuing commitment to neoliberalization 
are prone to weakening authoritarian states. I will bookend this analysis with a brief discussion of 
the external barriers imposed upon the social forces in the region and why the efforts to contest 
neoliberalism and authoritarianism in the Middle East have to be complemented with struggles to 
produce a broader political movement to prevent international donors from actively buttressing 
authoritarian regimes. 
he (authoritarian) neoliberal bargain: Sustaining growth or legitimacy? 
In what ways has neoliberalization complemented and reproduced authoritarian rule in the Middle 
East? While the international pressure to enforce macroeconomic reforms was central to neoliberal 
restructuring, it is vital to remember that state managers and incumbent rulers saw in prescribed 
policies a “development strategy” to forestall economic crises and re-activate their bases of social 
support (Connell and Dados 2014: 122–124). In many instances, policymakers and advisers who 
can be classiied as ideologically committed neoliberals, such as those who populated Ahmed 
Nazif ’s government (2004–2011) in Egypt or the technocrats that comprised Prime Minister Raiq 
Hariri’s inner circle in Lebanon, entered the picture much later on (Beinin 2009: 450; Joya 2011: 
370–371; Baumann 2016: 88–89). What pushed many countries in the region from the early 1980s 
onwards to abandon or vitiate the pre-existing models of state-led development in favor of neolib-
eralization was their inability to mitigate the structural limits imposed on them by their particular 
mode of integration into the global economy.  he slowly appearing cracks in the developmentalist 5
compact “posed a crisis of social control that by its nature could not easily be compensated for by 
intensiied repression” (Tripp 2013: 148), thus compelling policymakers and autocratic rulers to 
seek out new sources of economic stability and to establish international alliances. 
 From the end of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, state-led development 
strategies built around import-substitution industrialization (ISI), resource exports and corporatist 
alliances faced multiple challenges, which forced many states to seek assistance from international 
inancial institutions (IFIs) and to consider a radical realignment in their extant development mod-
els. he resultant recipes implemented throughout the 1980s and 1990s coalesced around analo-
gous efforts of 
privatising ‘inefficient’ state-owned enterprises, and adopting ‘iscal responsibility’, de-emphasising pub-
lic investment and social expenditures. Macroeconomic policies were reoriented, with the priority of 
combating inlation, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), and increasing openness to trade and 
capital lows (Naqib 2016: 42). 
Neoliberalism thus emerged as an alternative accumulation strategy that prioritized the commodi-
ication of public resources, regressive redistribution policies and a wider adoption of “market-like” 
organization in social life that reconigured the relationship between the state and households 
(Mudge 2008: 718–719). he “economic” components of this restructuring which aimed at offset-
ting the iscal crisis took on similar forms in different countries, but just as with other instances of 
neoliberalization around the world, the projects of state restructuring and economic reform that we 
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now commonly label as “neoliberal” in the region were designed and implemented by political 
forces of differing shades of legitimacy, and materialized in a range of institutional settings. 
 In Turkey, this effort was led by the junta government of 1980, which rapidly took on the re-
sponsibility to enforce economic reforms that the civilian governments could not have done so 
within the constraints of a minimal, but functioning parliamentary democracy. he military-led 
incubation period effectively shielded neoliberal reform from public contestation and paved the 
way for the delegation of policymaking to technocratic preferences ater the transition to civilian 
rule. In Egypt, reforms were brought about within a context of “de facto one-party domination in a 
formally permitted multi-party system” (Ayubi 1995: 351). he liberalization efforts materialized as 
early as 1974 with the initah. However, the dismantling of the Nasserite étatism required a careful 
balancing act between various corporatist forces, as radical steps provoked resistance such as the 
bread riots of January 1977—unleashed by the announcement of an IMF-induced cut in subsidies 
(Chalcrat 2016: 415). As a result, neoliberalization in Egypt manifested at a slower pace compared 
to the Turkish case and the scope of reforms expanded most signiicantly from the early 1990s on-
wards. 
 Despite institutional varieties, the reforms in Turkey and Egypt served a common purpose by 
reconiguring the states’ relationship with their citizens and their welfare provision responsibilities 
which created severe implications for employment patterns, household incomes and access to ser-
vices. Both societies witnessed an erosion of social and political gains that they had accumulated in 
the atermath of their national liberation through state-led development policies. his was a trend 
relected in other cases of neoliberalization in the region: state expenditures in most Arab states 
decreased drastically throughout the 1990s ater reaching their peak levels in the early 1980s, a 
process which was accompanied by the collapse of public investment in the same period with dras-
tic implications for housing, education and healthcare (Cammett and Diwan 2016: 67–71). Even in 
the periods of relative stability and growth, macroeconomic “success” did not necessarily translate 
into material improvements and the “rise in the degree of income maldistribution voided the 
broader welfare beneits of growth” (Kadri 2016: 4). As Angela Joya observes with respect to the 
Egyptian case, “[e]ven during the years of 7 per cent growth rates (2006–08) poor quality jobs 
without written contracts or social security were increasing, putting in doubt the neoliberal ratio-
nale that high growth levels would translate into higher living standards and decent job 
creation” (Joya 2017: 346). 
 he shit from state-led developmental models to neoliberalism did not only restructure eco-
nomic policymaking, but it also paved the way for a radical overhaul of the social and political al-
liances that sustained both the (minimally) democratic and authoritarian state forms in the region. 
Neoliberalization has eroded the material infrastructure of the developmentalist compact, which 
was built around the state’s pledge to “ensure social justice, foster economic development, and guar-
antee national interests in return for the political acquiescence of the citizenry” (Kamrava 2014: 20; 
Salem 2018: 130–132). As Mehran Kamrava highlights, from the 1980s onwards, “[t]o compensate 
for their diminishing or non-existent legitimacy they [regimes] oten alternated between repressing 
and co-opting the opposition, and relied increasingly on elements of repression and fear to stay in 
power” (Kamrava 2014: 27). his should not be read to the effect that pre-neoliberal regimes in 
Turkey and Egypt were necessarily more democratic than their current incarnations. But the devel-
opmentalist compact—regardless of its democratic shortcomings—did succeed in “grounding” it-
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self in “popular consent” to a signiicant extent until the 1970s and 1980s, and thereby was effective 
in assisting the regimes in avoiding major legimation crises (De Smet and Bogaert 2017: 212). 
 Accordingly, neoliberalization has been intimately linked to the survival and maintenance of 
authoritarianism in the region. When the reforms succeeded in providing a short-term ix to the 
macroeconomic predicaments, they offered a degree of stability and enhanced legitimacy to crisis-
stricken governments and rulers. However, the negative socio-economic impact of the reforms 
meant that the veneer of economic stability has been difficult to sustain and the implementation of 
neoliberal restructuring has continued to trigger political opposition and social mobilization 
against these policies as well as the rulers and governments behind them. 
Legitimacy, centralization, repression 
A focus on how the transition to neoliberalism has generated legitimacy issues for the rulers and 
governments in the region allows us to trace both the new repertoires of authoritarian rule and the 
acts of resistance and counter-mobilization that neoliberalization continues to provoke. his argu-
ment, in and of itself, is not new: Nazih Ayubi (1995), for example, documented how liberalization 
and privatization undermined the developmentalist compact in Arab states and helped unleash 
further authoritarian practices to solidify the regimes. More recently, Ian Bruff (2014: 124) pointed 
out the ampliication of authoritarian practices produced by neoliberalism’s legitimation crises and 
suggested that the present coniguration of authoritarian neoliberalism in the global North pro-
duces a simultaneous strengthening and weakening of the state—a dialectic marked by the state’s 
increased deployment of coercive, non-democratic measures and the parallel erosion of its legiti-
macy. 
 Given the reconstitution of authoritarian state power in the region in the atermath of the upris-
ings, it is easy to prioritize authoritarian “resilience” and lose sight of the ever-present tensions be-
tween the expanded scope of repression and maintaining legitimacy. Equally important is the con-
tinuing role neoliberalization plays in heightening this contradiction as the process of unleashing 
extensive redistributive reforms also involves “the open-ended challenges of managing the atten-
dant economic consequences, social fallout, and political counteractions” (Peck, heodore and 
Brenner 2010: 106, emphasis added). To unpack this contradiction further, below I will discuss the 
episodes of labor mobilization and urban governance reform where we can identify the state 
strengthening/weakening dialectic at work in Egypt and Turkey. 
 Despite their relative absence as an important actor in the democratization literature—especial-
ly in comparison to the military, “middle classes” and Islamists (cf. Allinson 2015)—organized la-
bor continues to be a key agent in challenging the authoritarian rule in both Egypt and Turkey. 
While the trade unions did not represent the dominant force in the uprisings, the organized labor 
struggles had a key role in mobilizing the masses both before and during the events. Prior to the 
uprisings, both countries witnessed major workers’ actions which were sustained and received 
popular support from wider segments of society. In Egypt, the period of 1998–2008 witnessed the 
mobilization of 2 million workers, which represented “the largest and most sustained social move-
ment in Egypt since the campaign to oust the British occupiers following the end of World War 
II” (Beinin 2009: 449). his mobilization intensiied with the opposition to the Labour Law of 2003, 
which, while legalizing strike action under strict terms, formalized short-term contracts and 
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curbed employment rights (Duboc 2014: 234–235). “he landmark strike of 24,000 workers of El-
Mahalla al-Kubra Spinning and Weaving Company in 2006 opened the door for an avalanche of 
labour mobilisation”, followed by further factory occupations and hunger strikes (Abdelrahman 
2012: 617). In Turkey, rapidly decreasing union density circumscribed the scope of workers’ action, 
yet the pre-Gezi public sphere was still marked by signiicant mobilizations, including a 78-day 
long occupation organized by the workers of the privatized tobacco monopoly TEKEL in Ankara. 
 he crucial point here is that these mobilizations emerged despite a radical expansion of anti-
union measures and the governments’ attempts to control the labor movement. he AKP govern-
ment’s industrial relations and labor markets reforms have been a key aspect of a broader trajectory 
of neoliberalization. Labor legislation has promoted lexibilization and undermined contractual 
rights, while simultaneously tightening the restrictions on collective bargaining and trade union 
mobilization which has effectively resulted in a process of government-supported deunionization 
(Bozkurt-Güngen 2018). Workers’ mobilizations in the AKP era have had to contest both the leg-
islative attacks on trade unionism and the government’s decision to “postpone” key strike actions 
on dubious “national security” grounds (Çelik 2015: 630). In Egypt, the labor mobilization could be 
contained neither by the state’s supervision attempts through the  Egyptian Trade Union 
Federation  (ETUF)—which “served as a state instrument to curb labor militancy rather than an 
organization representing labor interests” (Duboc 2014: 247)—nor by the post-uprising attacks on 
independent collective action led by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. 
 It is important to highlight that the governments’ attempts to limit organized dissent and pro-
tect important pieces of legislation from public contestation do not exclusively rely on “extra-legal” 
means, but are constituted by a mixture of overt coercive action and legislative reform. Anti-demo-
cratic practices and contentious pieces of policymaking are increasingly legislated and constitution-
alized. he legal codiication of these practices does contribute to the strengthening of the regimes 
in the sense that the political spaces in which dissident social forces could formulate oppositional 
demands are curtailed. Yet, at the same time, these exclusions can create further issures, leading 
social and political antagonisms to appear in other arenas. 
 In Egypt, the state’s attempt to control the labor movement through the ETUF increased the rit 
between the union hierarchy and rank-and-ile members, and triggered the development of inde-
pendent trade unions—including the formal recognition of the Egyptian Federation of Indepen-
dent Trade Unions (EFITU). While the EFITU itself has taken a conservative line ater 2013, work-
ers’ mobilization in Egypt has continued to develop at a steady pace (Charbel 2016). In Turkey, 
trade union organization has witnessed radical attacks following the declaration of emergency rule, 
including an expansion of the existing legislation on strike bans which has resulted in bans for sev-
en strike actions since July 2016. he “legal” barriers erected against formal labor mobilization have 
curtailed the number of actions—involving both workplace-based actions and general workers’ 
protests—from just over a thousand in 2014 to 607 in 2017. Yet the individual actions, which also 
encompass ad hoc and diffuse forms of protest embraced by public and private workers, increased 
from 729 in 2016 to 1,313 in 2017 (see Figure 1).  6
 Another important site where we can trace the unintended mobilizational effect of expanding 
authoritarian rule, and in particular, executive centralization, is the neoliberalization of urban gov-
ernance in Turkey. As with other key policy areas, the AKP government has pursued centralization 
in urban governance, by blurring the separation of powers, cutting out independent auditing mech-
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anisms, limiting public participation in policy discussions and selectively empowering/disempow-
ering local authorities. Since 2003, the government has continually enhanced the powers of the 
Housing Development Administration (TOKİ) and deployed it as a vehicle to expand the housing 
stock. Operating directly under the Prime Minister’s office, TOKİ has been authorized to expropri-
ate land and property, claim ownership of the existing treasury lands and facilitate public-private 
partnerships to implement urban transformation projects (Tansel 2018b). Despite its “social” objec-
tives, the Administration has become a de facto private competitor and regulator in Turkey’s lucra-
tive housing market, and utilized its broad competencies to commodify land and property, as well 
as “acting as a catalyst for the private sector” through its revenue-sharing partnerships (Atasoy 
2016: 671). 
 he Administration’s legally sanctioned ability to unilaterally launch urban transformation 
projects has sparked resistance from residents and civil society groups, and in several cases, the 
courts ordered the Administration to halt or revise the projects. Yet TOKİ projects have remained 
immune to these challenges, as the very grounds on which the Administration can claim ownership 
of land and properties have been carefully codiied and legalized by legislative and administrative 
reform. On the surface, this suggests another signature case of state strengthening. Yet these nodes 
of executive centralization further trigger mobilizations beyond the established avenues of policy 
contestation. As Sultan Tepe notes with regards to two contested urban transformation projects in 
Istanbul, the ease with which legal challenges are dismissed by the project implementers “encour-
aged citizens to focus their efforts on forming collective action and putting pressure on elected offi-
cials” (Tepe 2016: 82)—a trend widely observable in both urban and rural struggles against privati-
zation and commodiication of land during the AKP era (Eraydın and Taşan-Kok 2014; Arsel, Ak-
bulut and Adaman 2015). he barriers placed in front of public participation and contestation by 
state strengthening divert rather than completely thwart resistance, and could further function as 
triggers for further mobilization. 
External anchors of authoritarian resilience 
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Figure 1. Number of workers’ protests and individual actions in Turkey, 2013–2017
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Beyond the oten emphasized internal challenges to democratization, the prospect of radical demo-
cratic transformation in the region also faces signiicant external restraints. hese restraints are 
exacerbated by the Western governments’ increasingly conservative and technocratic “democracy 
promotion” programs and the global donors’ (including the BRICS’) documented tendency to favor 
authoritarian stability over social and political change in the region. Externally induced democrati-
zation measures are not only inluenced by the donors’ interests and their relations with the recipi-
ent governments, but also constrained and “tamed” by competition for funding and by technocratic 
tendencies among “democracy assistance” organizations which compel them to focus on “measur-
able and regime-compatible programs” (Bush 2015: 186). 
 he restraints present in the “democracy promotion” programs have been mirrored in economic 
aid and development assistance initiatives. As Raymond Hinnebusch (2015: 28) has argued, “irre-
versible dependence on the West will continue to be a legitimacy liability in Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) as many of the grievances that motivated the uprising can be traced back to West-
ern pressures for neoliberalism and policies towards the region”. Governmental assistance extended 
by Western powers have not only promoted neoliberalization, but have done so in excessively un-
equal terms that served to privilege their interest at the expense of the recipient countries. For ex-
ample, the economic reforms promoted by the European Union as part of initiatives such as the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) came with strict conditionalities around trade liberaliza-
tion in manufactured goods while simultaneously shielding the European markets from Middle 
Eastern and North African agricultural exports (Hollis 2012: 83). Revised objectives of the eco-
nomic reform promoted by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) have further “moved to-
wards deepening and broadening the scope of application of the same economic template” (Roccu 
2017: 44). No less committed to neoliberalization than their Western counterparts, the Gulf states 
are also playing a crucial role in bolstering authoritarian regimes by providing them with economic 
and political assistance. As Adam Hanieh notes, “Unprecedented   levels   of   inancial support 
from the  Gulf  states  have been  central  to  the  survival  of  the  Sisi  regime  following the  July 
2013  coup” (2016: 1177). 
 hus, even though the domestic antagonisms that are reproduced at the local level should not 
be disregarded in any analysis of authoritarian rule, the trajectories of democratization and neolib-
eralization in the region are ultimately tied to the broader regional and global dynamics that shape 
the states’ and social forces’ spaces of maneuver. 
Conclusion 
In his 1999 exploration of Egypt’s neoliberalism, Timothy Mitchell highlighted that “[i]t is not un-
common now (…) to admit that so-called free-market reforms and globalisation may be accompa-
nied by political repression”. his statement was followed by a double warning Mitchell issued 
against both (neo)liberal observers who regarded such repression as “an unforeseen, unfortunate, 
and probably temporary side effect of the expansion of the global market”, as well as those on the 
other side of the political fence who claimed that it was “the predictable, necessary, and probably 
long-term consequence of the logic of capitalist development” (1999: 465). For Mitchell, neoliberal-
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ization in Egypt offered no clear-cut answers to the key question on the relationship between 
democracy and capitalism. 
 Mitchell was certainly correct to recognize that coercion, and authoritarian statecrat in general, 
was not merely an undesirable offshoot of neoliberal globalization. Contrary to Mitchell’s skepti-
cism of an inherent relationship between capitalism and democracy, the contemporary wave of 
global democratic debilitation forces us to acknowledge the necessity of uncovering a structural 
coherence or capitalist “logic” behind the survival and expansion of authoritarian practices. 
Whether one identiies the capitalism–authoritarianism link in Europe by tracing the socio-eco-
nomic and political impact of the shit from Staatsvolk to Marktvolk à la Wolfgang Streeck (2014), 
or in the ability of China and Russia to absorb market rule within a pre-established authoritarian 
framework, it is imperative to restate Nancy Fraser’s observation that “present processes of de-de-
mocratization indicate something rotten not only in capitalism’s current, inancialized form but in 
capitalist society per se” (Fraser 2015: 159). 
 his recognition does not have to be bracketed with an additional provision to pursue and apply 
an already-formed and deined “post-neoliberal” program, nor should it lead to a “homogeniza-
tion” of politics by hastily invoking problematic universalisms that underpinned Mitchell’s original 
apprehension (1999: 465–466). Even if we resist theorizing a structural relationship between capi-
talism and democracy (and its debilitation), the messy atermath of the uprisings clearly documents 
that certain tensions inherent to “the social and political organization of capitalism” (Harvey 1990: 
109) very much shaped the degree to which competing social forces produced their political agen-
das. hese contradictions were manifest in the post-uprising debates in Egypt and Turkey—for ex-
ample, in Egypt, they revolved around the urgency of generating employment and keeping inlation 
in check while also provoking fears that the policies geared towards those objectives could be de-
signed within the same framework of liberalization that marked the “crony capitalism” of the 
Mubarak era. 
 hus, instead of interpreting the upheavals of 2011–13 as a failure to democratize the region, it 
is more accurate to read them as an “unresolved rupture” in the epoch of neoliberalism (Hall 2011: 
705), which has created and continues to produce anti-democratic tendencies in both the global 
North and South. his emphasis on the anti-democratic pressures generated by neoliberalization 
allows us to avoid pathologizing authoritarian practices as characteristics of “political” systems out-
side the West, and to recognize them as modalities of rule that can emerge anywhere to alleviate or 
negate legitimacy crises. Liberal democracies themselves are not immune to incubating such prac-
tices: they are not only susceptible to producing their own authoritarian practices that are shaped 
by the lines of gender, class, race, ethnicity and (dis)ability; but are actively involved in propping up 
authoritarian regimes elsewhere. Just as authoritarian regimes are plagued with legitimacy crises, it 
is becoming increasingly visible that the institutions and practices of well-established Western 
democracies are too struggling to navigate the demands of competing social forces. he challenge 
for those concerned with the health of democracies is not exclusively extrapolating lessons from 
authoritarian regimes, but identifying and proposing alternatives for the structures that produce 
authoritarian state practices in the irst place. 
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Notes 
  See, for example, the repeatedly used medical analogies to portray authoritarianism as a foreign virus that 1
threatens Western democracies: “While American democracy suffers from many ills, its immune system is 
strong enough to repel the virus and heal the body politic. Other countries may not be as fortunate” (Gal-
ston 2018).
 See, inter alia, Diamond (2015); Bermeo (2016) and Kreuder-Sonnen (2018).2
 See, in particular, King (2009); Heydemann and Leenders (2011); Yom (2016).3
 See IMF (2007: 32) on Egypt; he Economist (2010) on Turkey and Tansel (2018a) for an overview.4
 By “abandoning” state-led development, I do not refer to some sort of “retreat of the state” that many ob5 -
servers had once associated with the expansion of neoliberalism and globalization. he state’s key role in 
supervising and actively constituting “the market” has been transformed, rather than dissolved, through-
out neoliberal restructuring (Tansel 2017; Peck, heodore and Brenner 2012: 277).
 his trend can be attributed to a 130,000-strong strike by the metal workers’ unions (the strike was even6 -
tually banned by the government) and protests by workers laid off from their jobs by decree laws (Emek 
Çalışmaları Topluluğu 2018: 6).
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